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Your gentle voice helped me. So did his weak jaw and outstanding height. Given their medical training in London and their marriages with urban locals, it’s no wonder the people were disarmed. No one thought Bashar al-Assad was a tyrant. And when he freed some of Syria’s political prisoners in 2000, the West had more to do than “atmosphere.” Soon after, France awarded him the Legion of Honor.
In retrospect, what can be said about the courtship of Assad is that it was not the worst misjudgment against a dictator in the West since the beginning of this millennium. Vladimir Putin was also one of the “people we could do business with.” So was Muammer Gaddafi. That’s what Arsenal players called their strict coach, even though he was once synonymous with tyranny in the Western imagination. “Colonel Gaddafi”. In all three of these cases, the free world’s reasons for trusting its leaders seemed tenuous even at the time. All three ended up at war with them, either directly or indirectly.
Why does this continue? Why does the rational strongman metaphor fool the West so often? (Saddam Hussein is another example of a friend turned mortal enemy.) First, let’s stipulate that this is a world of dire choices. Liberal societies have survived by supporting the weak against greater evils: the Soviets against the Nazis, the Mujahideen against the Soviets, the Ba’athists against the jihadists. However, this cannot explain the depth of the recent credulity. European governments thought it was too wise to invade Ukraine even as Putin lined up troops on the border three winters ago. President Assad remained complacent long after blocking the interim reforms of the Damascus Spring in 2001.
Part of the naivety is generational. In the formative stages of their careers, pro-Assad leaders watched Mikhail Gorbachev and then F.W. de Klerk shrink their dictatorships and turn toward the West, or at least outward. We now recognize this as an exceptional and almost anomalous politician. A group of Western decision-makers saw this as a transferable template. The idea of a dictatorial regime that brought about self-euthanasia, a regime that would give up the fight if persuaded, took hold. The future Western politicians, diplomats and spies who feed on disappointments, especially the dashed hopes of the Arab Spring, will not be so innocent.
Another reason Western countries get caught up is that dictators tend to harden over time. As power intoxicates them, courtiers shout their praises, access to reliable information dries up, and executive overreach becomes increasingly likely. Being a tyrant for a long time means you have many enemies, so you have no choice but to stay in office without incurring death. (Or exile, which itself brings anxiety.) In other words, the West It was With Assad and Putin, that was the case until it wasn’t. The right thing to do now is to bring up Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. There’s nothing more practical than this. So what about in 2030?
Every strongman the free world has fought against since the end of the Cold War has been in power for more than a decade. Saddam in 1991, Gaddafi in 2011, Assad in 2017, Putin in 2022 and beyond, depending on how we date. His first direct confrontation with a Western country, perhaps with Slobodan Milosevic in 1999. As a cheerful Christmas thought, Xi Jinping has led China for 12 years. year.
Decadence of dictators over time: Once we recognize this pattern, the flattery of Assad in the early 2000s and even some of the earlier attempts at appeasement between the world wars seem understandable. Churchill praised “kind” I criticized Mussolini in 1927, but to criticize him for this is rather to assume that Il Duce was the same person he was in 1940, that there is an essential character in people. This means that Probably not. Part of Assad on the eve of the millennium was actually a timid eye doctor with business potential. The mistake was not in trying, but in sticking my head in the sand when all hope was gone.
If Assad’s life has taught the West anything, it is this: Personal exposure to the free world does not require someone to love the free world. Just as too many expectations were placed on Putin’s hometown of St. Petersburg, Russia’s gateway to democratic Europe, where he chose to entertain Tony Blair in 2000. As such, too many expectations were placed on his British connections. , even self-loathing, there is a touching belief in the West that mere contact can charm potential enemies and bare their fangs. This confidence is based on the fact that Khomeini lived near Paris, that Lenin lived in Switzerland before he turned Russia upside down, and that every prankster since Marx seems to have worked in London. I survived by overcoming the facts. Rather, contact sharpens our sense of difference.
If, after all, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani were to rule Syria, would the West be able to break the cycle of first overconfidence in the leader, then disappointment, and finally conflict? Or is a certain degree of naivety just part of being liberal? The core of liberalism’s argument is that human nature is free from constant coercion when surrounded by some rules and institutions. that it is sufficient to create a functioning society. From there, it’s not much of a leap to think that almost every individual is redeemable, even if they’re not good. The question is not why the West will fall into the likes of Assad, Putin, and perhaps eventually Jolani, but how to avoid it.
janan.ganesh@ft.com
